By Prof. Dr Kenneth Lasoen, intelligence and security expert at The Knowledge Centre for Security Intelligence (KSI).
Secret Networks
During the Cold War, when the Russian threat was as real as it is today, NATO countries developed secret networks known as “Staybehind” organisations. These networks were intended to organise resistance and gather intelligence in the event of an enemy invasion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these programmes were dismantled or marginalised.
However, the recent aggression by the Russian Federation against Georgia and Ukraine, as well as explicit threats by Russian President Vladimir Putin to carry out sabotage in Europe, raises the question of whether such a system might once again be necessary in today’s context — albeit with some essential updates.
Our war too
Putin’s war against Ukraine is equally a war against the West. We may not wish to see it that way, but for Moscow, it is war. The US was recently named outright as an enemy (and by extension, its allies), and Putin’s rhetoric — echoed by his inner circle — increasingly refers to concrete actions against “small European states.” Soon after, several countries experienced large fires, explosions, and other mysterious incidents. Explosives have been found on undersea pipelines and cables, and it is clear that critical infrastructure is a prime target for sabotage. Russian intelligence services are more active than ever and will stop at nothing. On our side, however, we are ill-equipped to face this threat.
Staybehind
This is why reinstating a Staybehind system might be worth considering — not as a copy of its Cold War predecessor, but as an additional layer of security to strengthen resilience and protect citizens against various forms of hybrid warfare, including espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. In light of modern threats, a Staybehind network should focus on unconventional warfare. Training should include cyber defence, counterintelligence, and resilience against disinformation. The goal would be to increase vigilance, making it harder for covert hostile activities to cause harm — whether that be “ordinary” espionage, fifth column activity, or sabotage.
Espionage
Belgium’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2021 already acknowledged the need to better equip the country against the subversive activities of hostile intelligence services:
“Belgium, as host country to several European institutions and NATO headquarters, is an attractive target for espionage and interference. To counter this threat, the intelligence services aim primarily to create a ‘hostile operating environment’ for foreign intelligence officers. In this way, a national security culture is created that ensures the necessary resilience against the threat of espionage and interference.”
Kennis over inlichtingen aanscherpen!
De NVS is inmiddels hopeloos gedateerd, o.a. omdat de agressiviteit van bepaalde inlichtingendiensten proporties aanneemt waarbij onze veiligheidsdiensten hun expertise, waakzaamheid, en mogelijkheden om op te treden, drastisch moeten worden aangescherpt. Een staybehindsysteem zou extra ondersteuning kunnen leveren en effectief mede een atmosfeer kunnen creëren die de bewegingsvrijheid van vijandige agenten heel wat meer inperkt dan momenteel het geval is. Het is daarentegen zeer begrijpelijk dat deze materie gevoelig kan liggen. De Staybehind heeft een smet opgelopen met zijn Italiaanse versie, GLADIO, die in de jaren negentig aanslagen heeft gepleegd. In België werd, door sommigen, nadien de link gelegd met de Bende van Nijvel, ook al lijkt het bijzonder onwaarschijnlijk, dat de zorgvuldig geselecteerde patriotten zich schuldig zouden hebben gemaakt aan gratuit geweld tegen de eigen mensen. Maar dit keer kan een geüpdate versie van de Staybehind volledig wettelijk omkaderd worden en ook onder het concrete toezicht van de democratische controle vallen, onder de Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten. De heropstanding van een staybehindsysteem in West-Europa kan een effectieve manier zijn om de defensieve capaciteit te versterken, in het licht van de huidige dreigingen vanuit Rusland.
Counterintelligence
By focusing on counterintelligence, counter-subversion, and the integration of modern unconventional military doctrines, our countries can develop a robust national defence system capable of deterring potential aggressors and promoting security.
About Kenneth Lasoen
Prof. Dr Kenneth Lasoen (°1985) is a historian and lecturer at the University of Antwerp (UGent and KU Leuven) and works for The Knowledge Centre for Security Intelligence (KSI). He obtained his master’s degree in Intelligence and Security Studies in London and at the University of Cambridge. He is also an alumnus of the Advanced Studies in Security and Defence (2019–2020) at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence. He is a member of M & M – Club Brabant. For speaking engagements, contact: k.lasoen@kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.be.
This column was published in the National Journal Mars & Mercurius – July 2024-3.