{"id":1534,"date":"2024-07-29T15:57:36","date_gmt":"2024-07-29T13:57:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.nl\/?p=1534"},"modified":"2024-07-29T15:57:37","modified_gmt":"2024-07-29T13:57:37","slug":"gaan-we-naar-een-heropstanding-van-de-staybehind","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/gaan-we-naar-een-heropstanding-van-de-staybehind\/","title":{"rendered":"Are We Heading Towards a Revival of the \u201cStaybehind\u201d?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>By Prof. Dr Kenneth Lasoen, intelligence and security expert at The Knowledge Centre for Security Intelligence (KSI).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Secret Networks<\/strong><br>During the Cold War, when the Russian threat was as real as it is today, NATO countries developed secret networks known as \u201cStaybehind\u201d organisations. These networks were intended to organise resistance and gather intelligence in the event of an enemy invasion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these programmes were dismantled or marginalised.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the recent aggression by the Russian Federation against Georgia and Ukraine, as well as explicit threats by Russian President Vladimir Putin to carry out sabotage in Europe, raises the question of whether such a system might once again be necessary in today\u2019s context \u2014 albeit with some essential updates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Our war too<\/strong><br>Putin\u2019s war against Ukraine is equally a war against the West. We may not wish to see it that way, but for Moscow, it is war. The US was recently named outright as an enemy (and by extension, its allies), and Putin\u2019s rhetoric \u2014 echoed by his inner circle \u2014 increasingly refers to concrete actions against \u201csmall European states.\u201d Soon after, several countries experienced large fires, explosions, and other mysterious incidents. Explosives have been found on undersea pipelines and cables, and it is clear that critical infrastructure is a prime target for sabotage. Russian intelligence services are more active than ever and will stop at nothing. On our side, however, we are ill-equipped to face this threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Staybehind<\/strong><br>This is why reinstating a Staybehind system might be worth considering \u2014 not as a copy of its Cold War predecessor, but as an additional layer of security to strengthen resilience and protect citizens against various forms of hybrid warfare, including espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. In light of modern threats, a Staybehind network should focus on unconventional warfare. Training should include cyber defence, counterintelligence, and resilience against disinformation. The goal would be to increase vigilance, making it harder for covert hostile activities to cause harm \u2014 whether that be \u201cordinary\u201d espionage, fifth column activity, or sabotage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large is-resized\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.nl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/pexels-pixabay-159304-scaled.jpeg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.nl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/pexels-pixabay-159304-1024x705.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-1543\" style=\"width:503px;height:346px\" width=\"503\" height=\"346\"\/><\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Espionage<\/strong><br>Belgium\u2019s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2021 already acknowledged the need to better equip the country against the subversive activities of hostile intelligence services:\n\n\u201cBelgium, as host country to several European institutions and NATO headquarters, is an attractive target for espionage and interference. To counter this threat, the intelligence services aim primarily to create a \u2018hostile operating environment\u2019 for foreign intelligence officers. In this way, a national security culture is created that ensures the necessary resilience against the threat of espionage and interference.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"translation-block\"><strong>Kennis over inlichtingen aanscherpen!<\/strong><br>De NVS is inmiddels hopeloos gedateerd, o.a. omdat de agressiviteit van bepaalde inlichtingendiensten proporties aanneemt waarbij onze veiligheidsdiensten hun expertise, waakzaamheid, en mogelijkheden om op te treden, drastisch moeten worden aangescherpt. Een staybehindsysteem zou extra ondersteuning kunnen leveren en effectief mede een atmosfeer kunnen cre\u00ebren die de bewegingsvrijheid van vijandige agenten heel wat meer inperkt dan momenteel het geval is. Het is daarentegen zeer begrijpelijk dat deze materie gevoelig kan liggen. De Staybehind heeft een smet opgelopen met zijn Italiaanse versie, GLADIO, die in de jaren negentig aanslagen heeft gepleegd. In Belgi\u00eb werd, door sommigen, nadien de link gelegd met de Bende van Nijvel, ook al lijkt het bijzonder onwaarschijnlijk, dat de zorgvuldig geselecteerde patriotten zich schuldig zouden hebben gemaakt aan gratuit geweld tegen de eigen mensen.&nbsp;Maar dit keer kan een ge\u00fcpdate versie van de Staybehind volledig wettelijk omkaderd worden en ook onder het concrete toezicht van de democratische controle vallen, onder de Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten. De heropstanding van een staybehindsysteem in West-Europa kan een effectieve manier zijn om de defensieve capaciteit te versterken, in het licht van de huidige dreigingen vanuit Rusland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Counterintelligence<\/strong><br>By focusing on counterintelligence, counter-subversion, and the integration of modern unconventional military doctrines, our countries can develop a robust national defence system capable of deterring potential aggressors and promoting security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>About Kenneth Lasoen<\/strong><br>Prof. Dr Kenneth Lasoen (\u00b01985) is a historian and lecturer at the University of Antwerp (UGent and KU Leuven) and works for The Knowledge Centre for Security Intelligence (KSI). He obtained his master\u2019s degree in Intelligence and Security Studies in London and at the University of Cambridge. He is also an alumnus of the Advanced Studies in Security and Defence (2019\u20132020) at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence. He is a member of M &amp; M \u2013 Club Brabant. For speaking engagements, contact:\u00a0<a href=\"mailto:k.lasoen@kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.be\">k.lasoen@kenniscentrumsecurityintelligence.be<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>This column was published in the National Journal Mars &amp; Mercurius \u2013 July 2024-3.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Door Prof. dr. Kenneth Lasoen, inlichtingen- en veiligheidsexpert bij het Kenniscentrum Security Intelligence. Geheime netwerkenTijdens de Koude Oorlog, toen de Russische dreiging zo re\u00ebel was als nu, ontwikkelden de NAVO-landen geheime netwerken, bekend als &#8220;Staybehind&#8221;- organisaties. Deze netwerken waren bedoeld om verzet te organiseren en informatie te verzamelen in geval van een vijandige invasie. Na [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":1535,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"off","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"1080","om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[55],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blogs"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/moscow-1570962_1280.jpeg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1534"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1544,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534\/revisions\/1544"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1535"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksi.institute\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}